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ABSTRACT 
We look into the available macroeconomic figures and the predictions 
made about the recession in Greece by international organizations, 
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predictions regarding the decline in real GDP in recent years were overly 
optimistic. The same entities predict that real GDP will fall by 4.2-4.6% 
during 2013. However, by our calculations, the drop may be steeper 
than the one predicted, even if some of the assumptions made by these 
institutes or the government materialize. We hope the steps taken will 
disprove the accuracy of our prediction. To that end we provide some 
policy recommendations.  
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Greece in Recession:  
Economic predictions, mispredictions  
and policy implications 
 
1. Introduction 
Caught in the tide of an international economic crisis while having surrendered 
monetary policy sovereignty for the operation of the euro-zone, and unable 
because of the high level public debt to engage in prolonged fiscal expansion in 
order to sustain the gross domestic product (GDP), in May of 2010 Greece 
accepted bailout loans from other euro-zone countries and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In exchange, the government pledged to adopt austerity 
measures to bring the state deficit under control, and to carry out reforms 
closely monitored and evaluated by the European Commission (EC), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. Consequently, the mild contractions 
in real GDP in 2009 and 2010 (by 3.1 and 4.9%, respectively) were succeeded 
by more severe ones in 2011 and 2012 by 7.1 and 6.4%, respectively1. That is a 
cumulative fall of 19.9% in five years, according to the figures published by the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT).  
It is generally assumed that the measures taken in 2011 and 2012 were to 
some or considerable extent based on expert views and expectations regarding 
the economy’s condition and performance. However, a good number of 
forecasts of how the economy would react or evolve, time and time again 
                                                 
1 The second figure (regarding 2012) is an official, yet temporary estimate.  It is expected to be 
finalized in October 2013. In a similar fashion, the figure regarding the 2011 recession, which was 
estimated to about 6.9% in March 2012, when the updated data were released in December 2012, 
was finalized to 7.1%. 
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turned out to be widely off the mark. In particular, the early estimates 
published by the EC, the IMF, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and research centers in Greece, namely, the Centre for 
Planning and Economic Research (KEPE) and the Institute for Economic and 
Industrial Research (IOBE), as well as the Greek government since October 
2010, are found to be overly optimistic. Understandably, while recognizing the 
challenge to estimate in advance the level of economic activity (especially 
when the progress of each and every factor involved is surrounded by 
uncertainty), such incidents cast doubt on the usefulness of the 
aforementioned reported predictions.  
Obviously, the issue is by no means new or limited to early predictions (as 
opposed to predictions carried out later in the year) or particular to Greece. 
E.g., Öller and Barot (2000), Loungani (2001), Heilemann and Stekler (2007), 
Merola and Pérez (2012). Furthermore, the repercussions may be crucial 
insofar as GDP mispredictions affect the accuracy of budgetary projections and 
other macroeconomic variables (Buettner and Kauder, 2010). In this context, 
Strauch et al. (2004) suggest that both GDP growth and budgetary forecasts in 
the EU range from too optimistic to overly cautious depending, respectively, on 
policy- makers exercising discretion or abiding by rules; while Jonung and Larch 
(2006) by linking the accuracy of potential GDP growth forecasts to EU Stability 
and Growth Pact fiscal policies, find that forecasts in several member-states 
(Germany, France, Italy) were consistently overoptimistic. 
Apparently, the GDP forecasts were also optimistic in the EU from the outset of 
the recent international economic crisis. According to Alogoskoufis (2012) in 
the spring of 2008, the European Commission expected the Eurozone’s growth 
rate to reach 1.7% by the end of the year, and 1.5% in 2009; when in fact the 
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zone’s economy slowed to 0.4% in 2008, and fell by 4.4% in 2009. By regressing 
the forecast error for real GDP growth on forecasts of fiscal consolidation for 
23 EU member-states and other European countries, Blanchard and Leigh 
(2013) maintain that forecasters underestimated fiscal multipliers. As a result 
growth disappointments were larger in economies that planned greater fiscal 
cutbacks. The IMF (2013b) goes further by adding that due to a number of 
idiosyncrasies and events, the private sector in Greece did not react as 
expected either; and admits that the economy encountered a much-deeper-
than expected recession. Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013) spell out a good number of 
policy mistakes and inconsistencies taking place in Greece and the EU. In 
addition, they point out that though it is not unusual for IMF programs to 
disappoint in comparison to initial forecasts, orders of magnitude are usually 
much smaller. Indeed, an output shortfall as large as the one which occurred in 
Greece can only be found in one percent of IMF programs. However, as we will 
show in the next chapter, the IMF was not the only connoisseur that got the 
recession forecast wrong. 
A large number of techniques have been used to obtain short-term GDP 
forecasts in a range of countries worldwide. These include time series models 
such as Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) (e.g., Runstler and 
Sedillot, 2003; Cushman, 2012; Kiariakidis and Kargas, 2013) and Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) models (e.g., Runstler and Sedillot, 2003; Cushman, 
2012), models that employ larger sets of explanatory variables such as factor 
models (e.g., Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2005; Schumacher, 2011; Antipa et. al., 2012) 
and bridge models (e.g., Runstler and Sedillot, 2003; Antipa et. al., 2012; 
Barhoume et. al., 2012), and mixed data sampling techniques (e.g., Andreou et. 
al., 2013; Ferrara and Marsilli, 2013) using financial data observed on higher 
frequencies to forecast GDP. With respect to Greece, Kiariakidis and Kargas 
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(2013) used time series decomposition, ARIMA methodology, and standard 
GDP regression techniques to obtain the 2012 GDP forecasts. 
Most of the analysts tend to use multiple methodologies to produce GDP 
forecasts in order to crosscheck and validate the associated figures. With this in 
mind we employ (a) a straightforward technique that produces GDP forecasts 
based on alternative scenarios regarding  its components in a deterministic 
way, (b) time series ARIMA models and (c) a macroeconomic formulation that 
allows GDP forecasting based on different investments and unemployment 
scenarios. Our primary purpose is not to obtain a point estimate of GDP, but to 
quantify and elaborate on the uncertainty involved in GDP predictions, even if 
one adopts the scenarios suggested by the aforementioned organizations and 
entities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 looks into the early 
predictions made about the recession in Greece in 2011, 2012 and 2013 by 
several international organizations (EC, IMF, OECD), the Greek government and 
Greek research centers prior to or at the beginning of each year. Sections 3 and 
4 proceed to re-estimate the predictions pertaining to 2013 via different 
statistical and macroeconomic models. To the extent the new forecasts are not 
very encouraging, Section 5 supplies a number of proposals. The final section 
(Section 6) provides the conclusions.  
2.  The issue of early predictions and mispredictions 
Table 1 lists the predictions made in late 2010 and early 2011 by the EC, IMF, 
OECD, KEPE, IOBE, and the government about the evolution of basic 
macroeconomic variables in the course of 2011, and (in the last column) the 
corresponding final figures published by ELSTAT. It turns out that while the 
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predictions regarding the fall in real GDP were in the range of 2.6-3.5%, the 
recession was much deeper: 7.1% (more than double the one predicted). In 
looking into the factors behind the misprediction, we note that that though the 
expected fall in private investments lied between 7.0 and 16.6%, the 
contraction evidenced in the data was about 19.6%. The exports, which were 
expected to grow by 3.9-10.7%, barely moved (+0.3%). The unemployment 
rate, which was expected to lie between 14.5 and 15.5% rose to 17.7%. 
Likewise, even though the early predictions made about the fall in real GDP in 
2012 were in the range of 2.0-4.7%, the estimates provided by ELSTAT (2013b) 
suggest the recession was more severe: about 6.4%. (See Table 2.) Again, we 
note that while the expectations regarding private investments lied between     
-4.0 and -13.1%, the estimates provided by ELSTAT suggest that in fact private 
investments shrunk considerably more: by about 19.6%. Imports, which were 
expected to fall by 2.8-5.7%, and exports, which were expected to rise by 3.2%-
6.5% appear to have fallen by 13.8% and 2.4%, respectively. The 
unemployment rate, which was expected to reach 17.1-20.3%, in the course of 
the last quarter of 2012 seems to have reached 26.4% (as per ELSTAT’s 
seasonally adjusted monthly data), thus affecting an annual average of 24.4%.   
The early predictions made for 2013 prepare the public for a recession of 4.1-
4.6%, and come with expectations that private investments will fall by 3.3-
9.5%, and the unemployment rate will reach 22.8-27.3% (see Table 3). In some 
quarters the figures foster optimism that the recession will be mild, about 3.0% 
(Alpha Bank, 2013). On the other hand, KEPE expressed concern that the 
unemployment rate may climb to 30.1%. In our view a rate in excess of 28% is 
quite conceivable bearing in mind the rate’s continuous rise for the last couple 
of years. The Bank of Greece (2013a: 21, 80) appears to share this view.  
  6 
This begs the question of what would happen if the unfavorable estimate of 
each GDP component materializes in the course of 2013. That is, if private 
consumption fell by 8.7%, as conjectured by IOBE; if public consumption fell  by 
7.2%, as estimated by the Greek Ministry of Finance; if private investment fell 
by 9.5%, as estimated by the OECD, etc. In this case, the answer is both 
mathematical and straightforward. The GDP expression which sums the 
demands of the different sectors of the economy serves as the point of 
departure. In scientific notation:  
 Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Xt - Zt + St ,                                                                                                                                      (1) 
where Yt stands for the GDP, Ct for private consumption, Ιt for private 
investment, Gt for public consumption, Χt for exports, Ζt imports, and St for the 
stocks that reconcile the other figures in year t. The percentage change of GDP 
from year t-1 to year t is given by:  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t
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TABLE 1: Predictions of basic macroeconomic figures made before or at the 
beginning of 2011 and final 2011 outcomes 
Source 
Ministry 
of 
Finance 
EC IMF OECD KEPE ΙΟΒΕ 
Results  
ELSTAT 
Publication date  
Oct.  
2010 
Jan. 
 2011 
Oct.  
2010 
Dec. 
2010 
Jan.  
2011 
Mar.  
2011 
GDP (% change, constant 
prices) 
-2.6 -3.5 -2.6 -2.7 -3.5 -3.2 -7.1 
Private consumption (% 
change, constant prices) 
-4.5 -6.4 : -4.3 : >-4.5 -7.7 
Public consumption (% 
change, constant prices) 
-8.0 -2.6 : -6.9 : : -5.2 
Investments (% change, 
constant prices) 
-7.0 -16.6 : -10.6 : : -19.6 
Exports of goods and 
services (% change, 
constant prices) 
6.1 10.7 : 3.9 : : 0.3 
Imports of goods and 
services (% change, 
constant prices) 
-6.6 -8.4 : -10.0 : : -7.3 
Domestic consumer price 
index (% change) 
2.2 : : : : 3.0 3.3 
Harmonized consumer 
price index (% change) 
: 2.4 2.2 2.5 : : 3.1 
GDP deflator  (% change) 1.3 0.3 1.3 2.4 : : 1.0 
Employment  (% change) -3.0* -2.6 -3.2 -2.4 : : -6.8 
Unemployment rate 
(yearly average) 
14.5* 15.2 14.6 14.5 : 15.5 17.7 
General government 
budget balance (% GDP) 
-7.0 -9.5 -7.3 -7.6 : : -9.4 
General government gross 
debt (% GDP) 
142.2 157.7 139.3 133.5 : : 170.6 
Current account balance 
(% GDP) 
: -8.3 -7.7 -7.5 : : -9.9 
GDP (million euro, current 
prices) 
232,100 : 232,942 231,532 : : 208,531 
Sources: EC (2011), ELSTAT (2013a), IMF (2010), IOBE (2011a), KEPE (2011), Ministry of Finance 
(2010), OECD (2010).   
Note: *The employment predictions are supplied in the government budget and are expressed in 
terms of national accounts figures.  
 
 
  8 
TABLE 2: Predictions of basic macroeconomic figures made before or at the 
beginning of 2012 and final 2012 outcomes 
Source 
Ministry 
of 
Finance 
EC IMF OECD KEPE ΙΟΒΕ 
Results 
(some 
temporary,  
some  
final) Publication date  
Nov. 
2011 
Jan. 2012 
Sep. 
2011 
Dec. 
2011 
Jan. 2012 
Dec.  
2011 
GDP (% change, constant 
prices) 
-2.8 -4.7 -2.0 -3.0 -3.4 -3.0  -6.4
a
 
Private consumption (% 
change, constant prices) 
-4.1 -5.7 : -5.2 : -6.5  -9.1
a
 
Public consumption (% 
change, constant prices) 
-7.5 -11.0 : -6.6 : :  -4.2
a
 
Investments (% change, 
constant prices) 
-4.0 -6.6 -13.1 -5.5 : :  -19.2
a
 
Exports of goods and 
services (% change, 
constant prices) 
6.4 3.2 : 6.5 : :  -2.4
a
 
Imports of goods and 
services (% change, 
constant prices) 
-2.8 -5.1 : -5.7 : :  -13.8
a
 
Domestic consumer price 
index (% change) 
0.6 : : : : 
   1.2 to 
1.4 
1.5
b
 
Harmonized consumer 
price index (% change) 
: -0.5 1.0 1.1 2.1 : 1.0
b
 
GDP deflator  (% change) 0.4 -0.7 0.3 1.6 : :  -0.8
a
 
Employment  (% change) -2.0* -4.8 -2.6 -2.6 : :  -8.0
b
 
Unemployment rate 
(yearly average) 
17.1* 19.7 18.5 18.5 20.3 18.5 24.4
b
 
General government 
budget balance (% GDP) 
-5.4 -7.3 -6.9 -7.0 : :  -6.6
c
 
General government gross 
debt (% GDP) 
145.5 160.6 189.1 177.1 : : 175.8
d
 
Current account balance 
(% GDP) 
: -7.8 -6.7 -6.3 -8.2 :  -2.9
e
 
GDP (million euro, current 
prices) 
212,544 : 217,083 215,048 : : 193,749
a
 
Sources: Bank of Greece (2013b), EC (2012a), ELSTAT (2013a,b), IMF (2011), IOBE (2011b), KEPE 
(2012), Ministry of Finance (2011, 2012), OECD (2011). 
Notes: * The employment predictions are supplied in the government budget and are expressed in 
terms of national accounts figures. 
a Temporary data ELSTAT (2013b). b Final data ELSTAT (2013a) .c Budget deficit according to Ministry 
of  Finance (2012), GDP according to ELSTAT (2013b). d Gross debt according to Ministry of  Finance 
(2012), GDP according to ELSTAT (2013b). e Current account according to Bank of Greece (2013b), 
GDP according to ELSTAT (2013b). 
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TABLE 3: Predictions of basic macroeconomic figures made before or at the 
beginning of 2013 
Source 
Ministry 
of 
Finance 
EC IMF OECD KEPE ΙΟΒΕ 
Publication date                                                                                     
Nov. 
2012 
Jan.  
2013 
Jan.  
2013 
Dec. 
2012 
Feb. 
2013 
Jan.  
2013 
GDP (% change, constant prices) -4.5 -4.4 -4.2 -4.5 -4.1 -4.6 
Private consumption (% change, 
constant prices) 
-7.0 -7.7 -6.9 -5.4 : -8.7 
Public consumption (% change, 
constant prices) 
-7.2 -3.5 -7.2 -7.1 : >-6.5 
Investments (% change, constant 
prices) 
-3.7 -4.9 -3.3 -9.5 :  -7 to -9 
Exports of goods and services (% 
change, constant prices) 
2.6 2.7 2.7 3.0 : ≥0 
Imports of goods and services (% 
change, constant prices) 
-5.2 -5.9 -6.2 -4.3 : -10 
Domestic consumer price index (% 
change) 
-0.8 : : : : 1 
Harmonized consumer price index 
(% change) 
: -0.8 -0.8 -0.2 1.6 : 
GDP deflator (% change) -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -0.5 : : 
Employment (% change) -2.1* -3.5 -3.9 -5.9 : : 
Unemployment rate (yearly 
average) 
22.8* 27.0 26.6 26.7 30.1 27.3 
General government budget 
balance (% GDP) 
-5.2 -4.6 -4.5 -5.6 : : 
General government gross debt (% 
GDP) 
189.1 175.6 178.0 188.6 : : 
Current account balance (% GDP) : -4.3 -1.2 -4.6 -0.7 : 
GDP (million euro, current prices) 183,049 : 185,000 184,569 : : 
Sources: EC (2013), ELSTAT (2013a), IMF (2013a), IOBE (2013), KEPE (2013), Ministry of Finance (2012), 
OECD (2012).  
Note: * The employment predictions are supplied in the government budget and are expressed in terms 
of national accounts figures. 
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TABLE 4: Relative weights of the expenditure components in real GDP (%) 
Year 
Private 
consumption 
(w1) 
Public 
consumption 
(w2) 
Private 
investments 
(w3) 
Exports of 
goods and 
services (w4) 
Imports of 
goods and 
services (w5) 
Change in 
stocks (w6) 
2000 69.06 19.68 20.94 24.96 -37.00 2.36 
2001 69.57 19.03 21.07 23.95 -35.92 2.30 
2002 70.45 19.72 22.30 21.21 -34.29 0.61 
2003 68.67 18.45 23.54 20.60 -33.33 2.05 
2004 68.32 18.30 22.64 23.16 -33.74 1.32 
2005 69.79 18.10 20.73 23.21 -32.50 0.67 
2006 69.02 17.68 22.58 22.95 -34.22 1.99 
2007 69.06 18.29 26.78 23.74 -37.85 -0.02 
2008 72.16 17.85 22.99 24.19 -38.27 1.09 
2009 73.33 19.33 20.48 20.12 -31.52 -1.73 
2010 72.32 18.57 18.31 22.26 -31.12 -0.35 
2011 71.84 18.96 15.84 24.05 -31.04 0.34 
2012 69.78 19.40 13.67 25.06 -28.59 0.68 
Note: Calculations based on quarterly data of GDP and its expenditure components as published by 
ELSTAT (2013b) until the last quarter of 2012. 
 
TABLE 5: Estimates of three international organizations and of the Greek 
government about the evolution in 2013 of real GDP based on predictions 
regarding the expenditure components  
Source 
Ministry 
of Finance 
EC IMF OECD 
Publication date Oct. 2012 Jan. 2013 Jan. 2013 Dec. 2012 
Real GDP estimate (% change) (calculations 
based on items 1-6 and the 2012 weights wi 
of Table 4) 
 -4.65  -4.36 -4.21 -4.46 
Published prediction of real GDP (% change) -4.5 -4.4 -4.2 -4.5 
1.  Private consumption (Ċ) -7.0 -7.7 -6.9 -5.4 
2.  Public consumption (Ġ) -7.2 -3.5 -7.2 -7.1 
3.  Investments (İ) -3.7 -4.9 -3.3 -9.5 
4.  Exports of goods and services (Ẋ) 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.0 
5.  Imports of goods and services (Ż) -5.2 -5.9 -6.2 -4.3 
6.  Change in stocks (Ṡ) * 0.0 0.0  * 
Note: * Since the Ministry of Finance and OECD have not published their estimates concerning the 
change in stocks this was taken as equal to zero for the calculations of real GDP, as in the EC and IMF 
predictions. 
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with the dotted terms standing for the percentage changes in GDP and its 
expenditure components, and the wi-terms standing for the relative weights of 
these components during the previous year. (It goes without saying that w1 + 
w2 + w3 + w4 - w5 + w6 = 1.) The relative weights, including those pertaining to 
2012, can be easily calculated from the annual data published by ELSTAT (Table 
4).  
Thus, by replacing the 2013 predictions for Ċ, İ etc., made by each national or 
international expert or the government, and by using the 2012 weights in 
equation (2), we are in a position to: 
 confirm each 2013 real GDP forecast and, thus, the internal consistency 
of each expert’s model or the government’s model; and 
 estimate what happens if the (a) worst, (b) best, or (c) middle case 
scenario prediction of  each real GDP component occurs.  
The computations show that each set of predictions is internally consistent 
(Table 5). That is, if the individual GDP components evolve in the manner 
expected by each expert or the government, then, indeed, the GDP ought to lie 
at the level reported2. In addition, if the worst case predictions for the GDP 
components came about (Table 6), we ought to expect real GDP to contract by 
5.9%; and if the best case predictions occurred, the recession to be around 
2.9%. 
                                                 
2 A minor divergence in the prediction made by the Ministry of Finance (-4.65% vs. -4.5%) may be 
attributed to the omission of stock figures from the 2013 budget. 
  12 
TABLE 6: Predictions of real GDP for 2013 based on the 2012 relative weights 
of its components (Table 4) and the different scenarios regarding the 
evolution of GDP’s components (as per the predictions provided in Table 3). 
Juxtaposition to outcomes of the previous years 
Basic macroeconomic figures Scenarios (% change) Results (% change) 
 
Worst Best Middle 2011 2012 
Real GDP estimate (Ẏ) -5.91 -2.92 -4.57 -7.10** -6.38** 
1.  Private consumption (Ċ) -8.7 -5.4 -7.1 -7.7 -9.1 
2.  Public consumption (Ġ) -7.2 -3.5 -6.3 -5.2 -4.2 
3.  Investments (İ) -9.5 -3.3 -5.4 -19.6 -19.2 
4.  Exports of goods and 
services (Ẋ) 
0.0 3.0 2.2 0.3 -2.4 
5.  Imports of goods and 
services (Ż) 
-10.0 * -4.3 -6.3 -7.3 -13.8 
Notes: * Although it is the worst scenario we use the largest drop in imports (which in facts increases 
real GDP), since it is in accordance with the predicted decrease of private consumption and 
investments. If the smallest predicted decrease of imports is used (-4.3), then the resulting real GDP 
change is -7,5%.  
**The estimated change of real GDP in 2011 and 2012 (based on equation (2) and the relative 
weights) is in accordance with the latest data published by ELSTAT (2013b). 
 
The range of potential outcomes underscores considerable uncertainty; while 
the prediction of a moderate fall in private investment (a critical GDP 
determinant) of about 9.5% in 2013, may be seen as exceedingly optimistic 
compared to the average decline of 19.4% observed in the previous couple of 
years. 
3. Two predictive models of real GDP based on time series 
In view of the above we now attempt two purely technical forecasts about the 
evolution of real GDP in the course of 2013. Both are based on the quarterly 
data provided by ELSTAT (2013a, b) from the first quarter of 2000 (i.e., 2000 
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Q1) to the fourth quarter of 2012 (i.e., 2012 Q4). More specifically, we make 
use of ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) time series models 
to estimate and predict the GDP based solely on its history, without resorting 
to assumptions about its components or other economic variables. That is, the 
forecast is based only on the dynamics of the series and does not take into 
account other factors, such as future policy measures, broader developments 
etc. Understandably, some degree of uncertainty has to be tolerated insofar as 
the models must predict four quarters ahead under the limitation that the 
published data regarding 2012 have not yet been finalized3. 
The first model uses quarterly GDP data from 2000 onwards, and the second 
model quarterly GDP data from 2005 onwards4. Yet, both provide similar 
forecasts (Table 7). According to the first model, the 2013 recession is 
estimated to about 6.08%, with a possible range of ± 2.16% (due to the 
increased uncertainty in the multiple period ahead forecasting); and according 
to the second model  the recession  is  estimated  to about  -6.18%,  with a 
possible range of ±1,72%. In our view it is encouraging that both models yield 
GDP forecasts of -6.7% and -6.4%, respectively, for 2012, i.e., similar to the 
outcome of -6.4% announced by ELSTAT. Last but not least, both models 
display a high degree of fitness: R2 = 98.2% (See Diagram 1.) 
                                                 
3 As already mentioned in footnote 1, a good indication of the direction the GDP in 2013 will be 
available when the revised 2012 national account figures are finalized (i.e., the autumn of 2013), and, 
perhaps, when data regarding the first quarter of 2013 are known. This said, if due to the urgent and 
pressing fiscal pressures experienced in Greece, and/or the need to (re)design economic 
development and social cohesion policies, an early prediction is required on the basis of available 
data; then, with due caution, it might be better if the prediction were carried out via more than one 
models. 
4 Often the use of the most recent data provides a better forecast since it takes into account the 
most recent history of the series. On the other hand, estimated parameters are less robust, due to 
the limited number of observations. 
  14 
 TABLE 7: Real GDP predictions based on time series models 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable: Quarterly 
GDP in constant prices (2005)   
Real GDP forecast 2013  
(standard error of forecast) 
-6.08% (1.08%) -6.18% (0.86%) 
Real GDP forecast 2012*  
(standard error of forecast) 
-6.69% (1.09%) -6.37% (0.86%) 
Sample period 2000 Q1 –2012 Q4 2005 Q1 –2012 Q4 
Explanatory variables: Coefficient** p-value Coefficient** p-value 
Constant 38512.12 0.0000 42067.54 0.0000 
Time trend 453.96 0.0000 333.39 0.0000 
Dummy 1st quarter -2876.24 0.0000 -3489.32 0.0000 
Dummy 2nd quarter 114.31 0.7821 191.76 0.8076 
Dummy 3rd quarter 2203.69 0.0000 2362.64 0.0027 
Dummy crisis period (2009 Q1-
2012 Q4=1) 
39947.12 0.0000 37326.29 0.0000 
Dummy crisis period x Trend -1168.49 0.0000 -1064.50 0.0000 
Moving average 1 period 0.293 0.0315 0.471 0.0087 
Moving average 3 periods : : -0.317 0.0149 
Moving average 5 periods -0.463 0.0001 : : 
Seasonal moving average 6 
periods 
-0.440 0.0059 -0.708 0.0013 
     R2 0.982 
 
0.982 
 
αdj R2 0.978 
 
0.975 
 
F-stat p-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.900 
 
1.786 
 
Notes: * The 2012 forecasts of the two models were re-estimated based on the observations until 
2011 Q4, and out of sample forecasts for the period 2012 Q1- 2012 Q4 were obtained. **   White 
heteroskedasticity corrected coefficients. 
Sources: The analysis is based on the latest data released by ELSTAT (2013b). The explanatory 
variables considered include: trend, trend2, trend3, dummies for each quarter, a dummy for the crisis 
period (taken also as a multiple of Trend, Trend2, Trend3), moving average terms of 1 up to 6 periods, 
seasonal moving average terms of 2 up to 6 periods. Autoregressive terms were not used so as to be 
able to perform static forecasting several quarters ahead. Model selection was based on the 
predictive ability of the models and the correction for statistical significant autocorrelations and 
partial autocorrelations of several periods. 
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DIAGRAM 1: Observed quarterly GDP in constant prices (2005) and 
predictions on the basis of the two alternative time series models (2005 Q1 - 
2013 Q4) 
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4. Predictions based on a typical macroeconomic model 
Having approached the issue of real GDP growth via its past values, we now 
endeavor to estimate its evolution by turning to the factors which by and large 
determine real GDP, namely the variables that (a) enter the production 
function (and hence the aggregate supply); and (b) affect the equilibrium in the 
goods and services market, the money market, and the country’s financial 
integration with the rest of the world (and, hence, the aggregate demand).  
To that end we outline a conventional, reduced form framework for an 
economy that is not in full employment (e.g., Ackley, 1961; Parkin, 1984; 
Mankiw, 2003), the expressions of which are also illustrated via graphs in 
Diagram 2. 
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The equilibrium in the money market is given by: 
r=f(M, Y, P, constant terms),                                                                                       (3) 
where r stands for the interest rate, Μ the quantity of money, Υ the real GDP, P 
the average price level. 
The equilibrium in the goods and services market is given by:  
r=g(Υ, G, Β, I1, Y*, P, constant terms),                                                                        (4) 
where G stands for public expenses, Β for transfers, I1 for private investments 
attributed to expectations over the future level of Y, Υ* for the income of 
foreign trading partners (in this context: the total GDP of OECD countries). 
Typically, indirect taxes are also included, but here by and large replicate the 
time series of Υ. 
At the same time the financial integration with respect to the rest of the world 
is given by: 
r=h(Y, Y*, P, constant terms)                                                                                       (5) 
under flexible exchange rates. However, r is inflexible in the case of fixed 
exchange rates.                                                                                                
So, the Aggregate Demand is derived on the basis of the expressions (3)-(5):                   
P=j(Y, M1, G, Β, I1, Y*, constant terms).                                                                     (6)  
In addition, the Aggregate Supply is given by:  
P=ω(L, K, Α, constant terms),                                                                                      (7) 
where L stands for the number of people employed in paid work activities, Κ for 
the capital stock, Α for entrepreneurship and technology. The amount of land is 
taken as constant. 
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DIAGRAM 2: The economy in terms of graphs regarding the factors that 
determine the level of GDP  
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So based on equations (6) and (7), the real GDP level may be written as follows:  
Υ=y( M, G, Β, I1, Y*, L, K, Α, constant terms).                                                            (8)      
In order to empirically estimate and predict the real GDP level we consider the 
time series of the (a) annual 1960-2011 national accounts published by ELSTAT; 
(b) monthly 1980-2012 monetary aggregates supplied by the Bank of Greece 
(2013b); (c) annual 1988-2001 drachma to US dollar and 2002-2013 euro to US 
dollar exchange rates, and (d) annual 1960-2012 five-year government bond 
yields supplied by Eurostat (2013). Then, after testing the interpretive ability of 
these regressors and taking into account the currency changeover, and 
weighing up the need to preserve degrees of freedom5, we estimate the 
following variant of equation (8) for the 1981-2011 period: 
Change in real GDP1981-2011 = 0.027*ΔL + 0.639*ΔΙ1,   N=31,   R
2=43.39%,           (9) 
                                                  (3‰)           (2‰)                                                     
with ΔL standing for the annual change in the number of actively employed 
people, and ΔΙ1 for the annual change in the value of private investments 
attributed to expectations over future income and demand (in billion euro at 
constant 2005 prices)6. The aforementioned regressors prevail over other 
available explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients, obtained via a 
robust variance estimator, are statistically significant. (The probabilities of error 
(p-values) are supplied in parentheses below the estimates.) 
                                                 
5 Understandably due to the paucity of observations (32-52 years) we do not use many explanatory 
variables. Among those considered is the technology-entrepreneurship vector supplied in Diagram 
4.III. It is empirically estimated (as a residual) from the production function Υ =  L
0.567k0.942 recovered 
from the 1960-2011 data. (k is the orthogonal variant (residual) of capital with respect to labor, L. 
R2=99.54%. The estimated output elasticities of labor and capital are statistically significant at the 
1‰ level.) A more detailed estimate of the technology-entrepreneurship variable across regions in 
Greece has been carried out by KEPE (2010). 
6 The size of I1 is empirically estimated from the residuals of Ι1960-2011 = 6.455 – 0.420*r + 0.198*Y. 
R2=90.68%. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1‰ level. 
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It goes without saying that it is important to verify the equation’s predictive 
capacity for 2012. Indeed, for an employment (job market) contraction of 
about 371 thousand people and a private investment contraction of about 5.5 
billion euro (as per the 2012 national account figures published by ELSTAT)7, 
according to expression (9) we should expect a fall in real GDP of about 6.6%. 
According to the official statistics, indeed, in 2012 the contraction was about 
that. (See Table 2.) 
Likewise, in order to engage in predictions for 2013, we incorporate the figures 
pertaining to 2012, and re-estimate the relationship. It turns out that:   
Change in real GDP1981-2012 = 0.026*ΔL + 0.666*ΔΙ1, N=32, R2=50.91%     (10) 
                                                 (<1‰)         (2‰)                                                     
So for an additional contraction in employment of about 250-300 thousand 
people (i.e., a contraction smaller than the one observed in 2012)8, and private 
investment of 4.7 billion euro (i.e., four fifths of the one observed in 2012), 
ceteris paribus, real GDP is estimated to shrink by 5.6-6.4%9. More if the 
contraction in employment in larger. See Table 8. This is consistent with (and 
by and large corroborates) the findings of the two technical predictions. On the 
other hand, if in the course of 2013, private investment falls as much as in the 
                                                 
7 The 5.5 billion contraction in private investments corresponds to the 19.2% drop which is supplied 
in the last column of Table 2. 
8 If these people do not migrate or withdraw from the workforce then the unemployment rate will 
climb to 28-29%. 
9 If we incorporate the figures associated with 2012, then the investment expression takes the form: Ι 
= 6.329 – 0.377*r + 0.192*Y. R2=87.15%. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 
1‰ level. Accordingly, Ι1 is estimated from the residuals as follows: Ι1 = Ι - (6.329 – 0.377*r + 
0.192*Y), hence ΔΙ1 = ΔΙ + 0.377*Δr – 0.192*ΔY.  As a consequence, the 2013 GDP prediction is 
calculated in conjunction with expression (10) and is a follows: ΔΥ = 0.026*ΔL + 0.666*ΔΙ1 = 0.026*ΔL 
+ 0.666* (ΔΙ + 0.377*Δr – 0.192*ΔY) → ΔΥ = (0.026*ΔL + 0.666* ΔΙ + 0.251*Δr) / (1.128). To estimate 
the change in real GDP all one has to do is to substitute the values of ΔL, ΔΙ, Δr. See Table 8. 
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scenarios listed in Table 6, then the recession will be milder and real GDP may 
shrink by 4.4 to 5.5%10. 
TABLE 8: Forecasts of real GDP change during 2013 based on scenarios  
A. If the private investments in Greece 
decrease by 
Β. If the number of employed persons  
(as measured in the national accounts) 
decreases by 
200 thnd. 250 thnd. 300 thnd. 350 thnd. 
1.2 billion euro in constant 2005-prices 
(or by 5.4% of the value of investments 
of 2012): middle scenario of Table 6 
-3.6% -4.4% -5.1% -5.9% 
2.2 billion euro in constant 2005-prices (or  
by 9.5% of the value of investments of 
2012):  worst scenario of Table 6 
-4.0% -4.7% -5.5% -6.3% 
4.7 billion euro in constant 2005-prices 
or by 19.4% of the value of investments 
of 2012 (i.e. the average contraction 
observed in the course of 2011 and 
2012) 
-4.9% -5.6% -6.4% -7.2% 
Notes: No significant changes were observed for changes of the interest rate of magnitude ±1.5%.  
 
In this context, the simultaneous presence of a recession and relative price 
stability witnessed in the second half of 2012 (Ministry for Development and 
Competitiveness, 2013)11, ought to be attributed to leftward shifts of the 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand schedules (See Diagram 3)12. 
This suggests that initiatives to end the recession may be carried out on either 
front. So we turn our attention to the options at hand.  
                                                 
10 To provide a measure of comparison to the private investment figures involved, suffice it to say 
that the annual value of depreciation in the private sector is estimated to be 13-15 billion euro. It 
corresponds to a depreciation rate of 6% for a capital of 230-250 billion euro (in terms of 2005 
prices). 
11 On the basis of the consumer price index. We are aware of the deflator estimate supplied in Table 
2. 
12 For a decrease in the general price level of goods and services to occur in the future, the aggregate 
demand schedule would have to contract more than its aggregate supply counterpart. 
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DIAGRAM 3:  A presentation in terms of graphs of the empirical findings 
regarding the determination of the GDP 
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5. Some options 
First of all we ought to take into account that the current economic crisis is the 
longest and most severe the country has experienced in the last sixty years (see 
Diagram 4.I). The closest historical parallel may be found in 1974, a year 
marked by political instability and regional tension as the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus brought Greece to the brink of war with Turkey. However, the similarity 
is superficial. In economic terms, the current situation is clearly worse both in 
magnitude and length (five consecutive years, not counting 2013). Last but not 
least, whereas (up until recently) it was possible to deal with negative growth 
rates by resorting to tried, tested and effective fiscal and monetary 
interventions, as mentioned in the Introduction, these basic policy instruments 
are no longer at the government's disposal. As a result, the options are limited. 
Like: 
a) Encourage foreign demand for Greek products and services, and attract 
investments in all sorts of projects (whether above or under the ground or 
water, whether tangible or intangible assets). An improved economic climate 
in the euro-zone and/or worldwide may be helpful13. Yet, the effort should 
be made even if conditions abroad became unfavorable or the creditability 
of other EU member-states were downgraded, confidence in the security of 
deposits in the euro-zone at large undermined etc14. Unfortunately the 
                                                 
13 Our econometric analyses of macroeconomic (national account) figures suggest that ceteris 
paribus: An increase (decrease) in incomes by 1% in OECD-countries will positively (negatively) affect 
Greek exports by 0.55%. A decrease (increase) by 1% of relative prices in Greece vis-à-vis OECD 
countries is expected to stimulate (reduce) the volume of tourism services from foreign countries by 
0.87%. A decrease (increase) in the real effective exchange rate by 1% is expected to stimulate 
(reduce) Greek exports by 0.32%. 
14 For instance, the EC-ECB-IMF proposition in mid-March to seize a part of insured deposits in Cyprus 
(though eventually rejected by the Cypriot legislature) and a large portion of deposits over 100,000 
euro, is likely to prevent potential investors from engaging in businesses (for which this kind of large 
bank account are needed) in other euro-zone countries in which the EC, the ECB and the IMF 
collectively have a say. 
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euphoria of 2007-2008 about the country’s prospects has been succeeded by 
disappointment (see Diagram 4.II). For the psychology to change a 
succession of consistent signals by the authorities and the public that build 
faith in doing business in Greece is needed. May the long-awaited 
resumption of work on the expansion and modernization of the 
transportation network, privatizations, and the achievement of a budget 
surplus be in that direction. 
b) Increase the quantity and/or velocity of money in order to reduce the cost of 
borrowing and facilitate monetary transactions. This may be advanced in a 
number of ways: By recapitalizing the banking sector, by enabling the state 
to pay the money owed to private sector suppliers and VAT returns to other 
businesses, by deregulating Sunday shopping among small retailers etc. 
c) Deregulate markets and remove distortions in competition (in agriculture, 
trade, services, everywhere) so as to reduce prices and raise the level of 
output. 
d) Promote the overall state of technology and entrepreneurship, a pair of 
essential production inputs which currently seem to be at an all-time low 
(see Diagram 4.ΙΙΙ); and set up a friendlier business environment (see Vima, 
2011).  
e) Absorb and utilize the funds earmarked for economic development by the 
EU via the Greek National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), in areas 
and sectors associated with significant multipliers. Unfortunately, several 
NSRF operational programs lack a strategic focus, while planning and 
implementation are often based on (i) broad regional averages with little or 
no consideration for intra-regional heterogeneity and spillovers or (ii) 
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subordinate criteria, which, in turn, weaken the overall effect on real GDP. 
(Prodromidis and Tsekeris, 2011; Prodromidis, 2012). These flaws ought to 
be addressed. 
DIAGRAM 4: Evolution of real GDP and some rarely quantified figures (1960-
2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
Ι. Annual growth rate of the Greek economy (% change of GDP in terms of constant 2005-prices)  
 
Calculation details are given in footnote 6 
Calculation details are given in footnote 5 
 
ΙΙ. The size of investments associated with expectations over future income (on the demand side)  
ΙΙΙ. The size of entrepreneurship and technology (on the supply side)  
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6. Conclusions 
The early estimates of a number of international organizations, the Greek 
government, and the country’s research institutes in 2011 and 2012, suggested 
the recession would range between 2.6-3.5% and 2.0-4.7%, respectively, when 
in fact real GDP decreased by 7.1% in 2011, and 6.4% in 2012 (according the 
temporary data of ELSTAT (2013b)). Similar forecast errors are observed for 
individual GDP components.  Insofar as the early 2013 estimates provided by 
these institutes and the government point in the direction of a 4.2-4.6% 
recession, we are concerned that they may be overly optimistic as well. Maybe 
it is better if we treated these projections with caution.  
According to alternative models which we estimate based on different 
methodological approaches and temporal frequency, we find that any 
prediction for the actual GDP growth contains a high degree of uncertainty. The 
recession can lie in the range of 2.9-7.2%, possibly 4.4-6.4%, if the 
unemployment rate climbs to 28-30%. So it is best to avoid any complacency 
and to keep on taking steps towards improving the variables which contribute 
to growth as if the likelihood of last year's recession has not gone away. The 
situation is sensitive and stabilization has not yet occurred. As much as we all 
hope for the best, and that the measures taken by the policy-makers and the 
mobilization of society at large may halt the downward economic trend of 
recent years and even disprove the contractionary economic forecasts, it is 
important to have (prepare) alternative or additional plans in the direction of 
economic development, financial and social cohesion if the optimistic scenarios 
do not materialize.  
As the above lines were printed, ELSTAT announced a smaller the expected 
decline in real GDP during the second quarter of 2013: Specifically, that the 
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5,6% drop in the first quarter (vis- à-vis the  respective quarter of 2012) was 
succeeded by 3,8% drop in the second quarter. Beyond illustrating our basic 
point regarding the uncertainty of early projections, coupled with a general 
impression that the tourist season went exceptionally well in the third quarter 
(thus hindering a rise in unemployment), this may be a sign that the economy is 
inching toward the lower end of the estimated  range provided above. The 
argument regarding complacency holds. 
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